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Family Privacy and the Custody and
Visitation Rights of Adult Outsiders
JOHN DEWITT GREGORY*
The subject of this symposium, custody law and practice, could not
be more appropriate in light of Professor Robert J. Levy's grand contributions to the field as both a scholar and a lawyer. I first met Bob
Levy some thirty years ago when I attended a three-week teaching
conference sponsored by the Association of American Law Students,
at which Professor Levy was a faculty member. During the ensuing
three decades or so, he has been a generous, kind, and nurturing mentor
for me. If a law professor can have a guru, then Bob Levy is certainly
mine. More importantly, his contributions to the field of matrimonial
and family law are virtually incalculable. His 1976 casebook, Cases
and Materials on Family Law, has influenced this field enormously,
and I would venture to say that every casebook editor since that time
owes Bob Levy a debt of gratitude. His many articles on a variety of
topics have similarly influenced not only scholars but also decisionmakers in the field. Future family law teachers would do well to aspire
to the standard that Bob Levy has set.
To provide a context for the subject of this article, here is a brief
passage by Professor Levy, a respected family law scholar, teacher, and
practitioner who was the William J. Prosser Professor of Family Law
at the University of Minnesota Law School:
My concern is perpetuation of the family as the most important relationship in our society-as the unit which provides, and should continue to
provide, the basic emotional and socializing experiences for our children.
Those functions can be served effectively, I believe, only if the family is
* Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Hofstra University. The author thanks Alisa Epstein and Lisa Spar for assistance in preparing this
article. The article amplifies comments that the author prepared for a University of
Minnesota Law School conference honoring Professor Robert J. Levy.
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considered to be and is treated as an autonomous unit, and if families are
protected from untoward governmental interference with their operations.
Yet, the current "children's rights" campaign, by increasing government
intrusion into family decision making, has at least the potential to upset
the traditional social compact that undergirds these family-centered values. To eliminate the threat, we must strive to maintain a stance of "family
privacy" -a policy that families may not be supervised by judicial or
other agents of the state. I choose to call that stance "Respect for Family
Autonomy"; the people I call the "new child savers" claim that I am
simply an old-fashioned supporter of "parental rights."'

Remarkably, although he made them a quarter of a century ago, Professor Levy's observations are no less true today. Indeed, if the future
could have been foretold back in 1976, one might have responded to
Professor Levy's concerns by quoting
Al Jolson's storied remark, "You
2
ain't seen nothin' yet, folks.",
Professor Levy wrote against the background of the children's rights
or children's liberation movement, which was trendy and fashionable
in the 1970s. During that era, few would quarrel with judicial holdings
that protected the rights of children by insistence on due process protections in cases in which their physical liberty might have been restrained.3 Several commentators, however, did not limit their advocacy
of children's rights to arguments favoring due process; instead, they
sought affirmative rights for children. For example, explicitly rejecting
a double standard, one writer called for "the right to a single standard
of morals and behavior for children and adults." ' 4 Another prominent
1. Robert J. Levy, The Rights of Parents, 1976 BYU L. REv. 693.
2. John Bartlett, BARTLErr's FAmitAR QUOTATIONS (15th ed. 1980), describing
the quoted language as follows: "Ad lib remark introduced in the first talking motion
picture, The Jazz Singer, July 1927."
3. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment made inadmissible the coerced confession of a 15-year-old boy); Kent v.
United States, 484 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding in light of procedural protections and
benefits to child that inhered in juvenile court jurisdiction, waiver of jurisdiction and
transfer of proceeding to adult court could not be accomplished without hearing that
comported with constitutional due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding
that in juvenile court proceeding in which youth could be committed to an institution,
due process required adequate notice of charges; right to counsel; and right to confrontation, cross-examination, and constitutional privilege against self-incrimination);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
juvenile delinquency proceedings was due process requirement). But see McKiever v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
require states to provide jury trials in adjudicative stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings). See generally John DeWitt Gregory, Juvenile Court JurisdictionOver NoncriminalMisbehavior: The Argument against Abolition, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 242, 243-44
(1978).
4. See, RicHARD FARsON, BmRTHRIGHTS (1974). Farson states,
Children, like adults, should have the right to decide the matters which affect them
most directly. The issue of self-determination is at the heart of children's liberation.
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children's rights advocate proposed that any young person have "[t]he
right to do, in general, what any adult may legally do." 5
These days, one does not often hear such radical-indeed absurdsuggestions concerning so-called children's rights. Nevertheless, a new
and increasingly vocal generation of child savers has taken the stage,
purporting to speak for children and imperiling fundamental principles
of family privacy. Modem day self-styled child advocates have largely
abandoned the notion of children's rights and have adopted in its place
the shibboleth best interest of the child.
This article examines and comments on some of the legal issues
relating to third-party visitation, in which claims by legal strangers of
the right to associate with other people's children are invariably based
on assertions of children's best interests. Legal and Mental Health Perspectives on Child Custody Law: A Deskbook for Judges,6 for which
Professor Levy is the general editor, addresses these issues in chapter
17, "Grandparent and Third-Party Visitation." In the relatively few
years since the Deskbook appeared, there have been significant and
startling developments with respect to the legal treatment of claims by
legal strangers, particularly grandparents and other third parties. This
It is, in fact, the only issue, a definition of the entire concept. The acceptance of
the child's right to self-determination is fundamental to all the rights to which
children are entitled.... Children would have the right to engage in acts which are
now acceptable for adults but not for children, and they would not be required to
gain permission to do something if such permission is automatically granted to
adults. Id. at 27.
5. JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 19, 29 (1974). Holt flatly states, "[T]he
rights, privileges, duties, responsibilities of adult citizens available to any young person, of whatever age, who wants to make use of them." These would include, among
others:
1. The right to equal treatment at the hands of the law, i.e., the right, in any
situation to be treated no worse than an adult would be.
2. The right to vote, and take full part in political affairs.
3. The right to be legally responsible for one's life and acts.
4. The right to work, for money.
5. The right to privacy.
6. The right to financial independence and responsibility-i.e., the right to own,
buy and sell property, to borrow money, establish credit, sign contracts, etc.
7. The right to direct and manage one's own education.
8. The right to travel, live away from home, to choose or make one's own home.
9. The right to receive from the state whatever minimum income it may guarantee
to adult citizens.
10. The right to make and enter into on a basis of mutual consent, quasi-familial
relationships outside one's immediate family-i.e.,the right to seek and choose
guardians other than one's own parents and to be legally dependent on them.
Id. at 18-19.
6. See NATIONAL INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLOQUIUM ON CHILD CUSTODY, LEGAL
AND MENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD CUSTODY LAW: A DESKBOOK FOR

JUDGES (Robert J. Levy ed., 1998) [hereinafter DEKBOOK FOR JUDGES].
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article serves as an update of the relevant statutes and cases on the
subject. There is, however, one caveat. It should come as no news that
in June 2000, in Troxel v. Granville7 the U.S. Supreme Court decided
the first third-party visitation case it had ever undertaken to review,
holding that the Washington state grandparent visitation statute was
unconstitutional as applied. Since then there has been a welter of state
court decisions that interpret, follow, or purport to distinguish Troxel,
some of which have come down subsequent to the preparation of this
article. Undoubtedly, there will be many more such decisions in the
8
foreseeable future.
Historically, in this country respect for and recognition of the autonomy of the family and the authority of parents over their children was
well established, not only in law but also in societal cultural values.
Simply stated, there is a strong and enduring tradition of family autonomy in American law, of which the natural concomitant is parental
authority. Indeed, the Supreme Court established the principle quite
early in the twentieth century in Meyer v. Nebraska9 by explicitly rec10
ognizing the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children"
as a liberty interest that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed, thereby
supporting the rights of parents and contradicting assertions of the interests of the state. Just two years later, the Court reinforced its opinion
in Meyer when it enjoined the enforcement of Oregon's compulsory
education law against two private schools in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.11 The Court observed,
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that
the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State.... The child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with
12 the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.
7. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).

8. Despite the Supreme Court's long silence with respect to third-party visitation,
there has long been an abundance of state court decisions and legislative enactment on
the subject. See generally, John DeWitt Gregory, Whose Child Is It Anyway: The Demise of Family Autonomy and Parental Authority, 33 FAM. L.Q. 833 (1999); John
DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationalefor Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 351 (1998).

9.
10.
11.
12.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 399.
268 U.S. 510 (1972).
Id. at 534-35.
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For the most part, scholarly commentary has viewed the Court's
decisions in Meyer and Pierce as strongly supporting the prerogatives
of parents against challenges by states. One writer points out that the
Supreme Court "has consistently held that matters touching on natural
parent-child relationships and involving the custody and control of
one's children are fundamental liberty and privacy interests protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, they are entitled to the greatest
constitutional protection." 13
Despite these unequivocal holdings by the Court, advocates described by Professor Levy as the "new child savers" have been in full
cry against family privacy and autonomy principles. Common law
courts rarely intervened in the affairs of parents and their children on
behalf of legal strangers. Occasionally but infrequently, state courts
would afford standing to assert rights against a parent to a person who,
with respect to a particular child, had acted in loco parentis. Except in
such rare cases, courts respected the constitutionally protected liberty
interest of parents and rejected the claims of suitors who could not
show kinship with children who were the subjects of proceedings.
The first and thus far most extensive rejection of the family privacy
principle that was reflected in courts' traditional deference to parental
authority occurred in the context of grandparent visitation. Commonlaw grandparents were considered legal strangers to the same extent as
other third parties who sought to intervene in the autonomy of families.
By now, however, legislatures in every state have enacted statutes that
provide for some form of child visitation rights for grandparents. 14 An
authoritative commentator has astutely observed that since "these statutes are the product of a combination of the lobbying efforts of grandparents groups and the sentimentality of the state legislatures, they take
so many forms and limit visitation to so many different kinds of cir13. See Marian L. Faupel, The "Baby Jessica Case" and the Claimed Conflict
Between Children'sand Parents'Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 285, 289 (1994). See also
Ellen B. Wells, Unanswered Questions: Standing and Party Status of Children in
Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. 95 (1955). The writer
observes,
The traditional view of our society is that the care, control, and custody of children
resides first in their parents: in fact "constitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.".. .This parental
interest in family relationships has been defined as a liberty interest entitled to due
process protection.
Id. at 109.
14. See Troxel v. Granville,530 U.S. at 74, n. 1 (observing that every state provides
for grandparent visitation in some form and listing the statutory provisions in the 50
states).

168

Family Law Quarterly, Volume 36, Number 1, Spring 2002

cumstances that it is extremely difficult to classify them."' 5 The authors
of the Deskbook make a similar observation, albeit more pungently:
Under the English common law, a grandparent did not have a legal right
to petition a court to consider whether that grandparent should be allowed
to visit a grandchild. Indeed, grandparent visitation laws are a very recent
statutory innovation. To be sure, grandparent visitation and custody issues
have occasionally been presented to some courts, even in the absence of
a standing statute, in the disguise of adoption, guardianship, and neglect
proceedings; but without the benefit of legislation specifically authorizing6
standing, judges could and certainly often did refuse to hear such cases.'

Regrettably, the days of respect for family privacy appear to be gone
forever. Nowadays, grandparent visitation laws are so dazzlingly varied
that one can find a statutory provision in one state or another to fit
almost every conceivable situation. In some states, grandparents may
petition for visitation with their grandchildren when the parents are
either divorced or in the process of becoming divorced.17 In other states,
grandparents may petition for visitation rights when either one or both
of a child's parents are dead 18 or when a court has terminated the parental rights of one or both parents. 19 Still other statutes authorize
grandparents to sue when visitation is unreasonably denied for a specific period of time2° or when a grandparent and a child resided together
for a specified time period. 21 Among the broadest grandparent visitation
statutes is New York's, which permits grandparents to petition for visitation when "circumstances22 show that conditions exist which equity
would see fit to intervene."

15. HOMER H. CLARK JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES, §19.7, at 828 (2d ed. 1988).
16. DEsKBOOK FOR JUDGES, supra note 6, at 104.
17. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(A)(Michie 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b)
(Supp. 1997) HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46-3 (1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35
(West 1999 ); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. Ch. 119, § 39D (West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.402(1) (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 43-1802(l)(b) (1998).
18. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1117(l)(c) (1999) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(1)(a) (West 1997); MICH
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(b) (Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West
1998); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Supp. 1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§5311 (West 1991); TEx, FAM. CODE §153.433(2)(A)(Supp. 2000).
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b) (1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-16-3(1)(1999);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.050(d)(Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5C(A)(1)(k),
(1998); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (2)(E) (West Supp. 2000).
20. MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3(2)(1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402(3) (West
Supp. 1999).
21. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(2a)(1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2CC (1999);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5313(a)(1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433(2)(F) (Supp.
2000).
22. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1997-98).
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Courts in a number of states have been no less zealous in their concern for grandparent visitation rights than legislators have been. Illustrative is the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in King v.
King.23 The court in King upheld the constitutionality of a statute under
which a trial court had ordered visitation by a child's grandfather over
the objection of the natural parents of a child. Somewhat inventively,
the court provided the following reasoning for its decision:
This statute seeks to balance the fundamental rights of the parents, grandparents and the child. At common law, grandparents had no legal right to
visitation. However, the [legislature] ... determined that, in modem day
society, it was essential that some semblance of family and generational
contact be preserved. If a grandparent is physically, mentally and morally
fit, then a grandchild will ordinarily benefit from contact with the grandparent.... The grandparent can be invigorated by exposure to youth, can
gain an insight into our changing society, and can avoid the loneliness
which is so often a part of an aging parent's life. These considerations
by the state do not go too far in intruding into the fundamental rights of
parents.24
One could not ask for a more valid characterization of the holding and
reasoning of this case than that which a dissenting opinion provides:
The opinion of the majority makes little pretense of constitutional analysis
but depends entirely on the sentimental notion of an inherent value in
visitation between grandparent and grandchild, regardless of the wishes
of the parents. The fatal flaw in the majority opinion is in its conclusion
that a grandparent has as "fundamental right" to visitation with a grand25
child. No authority is cited for this proposition as there is no such right.

The decision in King is one of many blatant examples of courts'
assertion of the so-called best interests of a child to reach a decision
that has no doctrinal support. In Herndon v. Tuhey 26 the Supreme Court
of Missouri permitted grandparent visitation under a statute that authorized the court to grant visitation rights to grandparents if visitation
was unreasonably denied for more than ninety days. 2 ' The statute also
required a determination whether visitation would be in the child's best
interests or would endanger the physical health or impair the emotional
development of the child.28 In addition, the statute allowed a visitation

23. 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 632 (citation omitted).
Id. at 633 (Lambert, J. dissenting).
857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
Id. at 206-07.
Id. (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (West 1997)).
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order only "when the
court finds such visitation to be in the best in29
terests of the child."
Despite the fact that there were arguments, physical altercations, and
lawsuits involving money and property between the parents and grandparents of a ten-year-old child, the court found that the grandparent
visitation statute was constitutional and ordered visitation. The court in
Herndon agreed with the Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion in King
and concluded,
Missouri's statute is reasonable both because it contemplates only a minimal intrusion on the family relationship and because it is narrowly tailored to adequately protect the interests of parents and children.... A
court may grant visitation only if it will be in the best interest of the child.
If visitation would endanger the child physically, mentally or emotionally
then visitation must be denied.3 °

As in King, the Missouri court's opinion in Herndon evoked a strong
and persuasive dissent. The dissenting opinion pointed out that the decision of the majority of the court "rests in actuality upon the trial
court's discretion, rather than upon traditional principles of constitutional analysis.", 3 1 Moreover, "[a] best interest test standing alone does
not justify intrusion into the parents' constitutionally protected right of
autonomy in child rearing."32
For anyone who is respectful of parental autonomy, it is encouraging
to note that the dissenting opinions in King and Herndon, or at least
the principles set out in those dissents, have emerged in grandparent
29. Id.
30. Id. at 210; see also Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995) (holding
that the Wyoming grandparent visitation statute was constitutional and concluding that
"in addition to the compelling state interest attaching to the best interest of the children,
the compelling state interest exists in maintaining the right of association of grandparents and grandchildren"). Id. at 151 Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1997)
(holding that a statute permitting either parent of the deceased parent of the child to
petition for visitation with the child "[did] not deprive the parents of their right to raise
their children by determining the care, custody and management of the child"). Id. at
915.
31. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Mo. 1993) (Covington, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 211. Supreme Court of Wyoming was similarly sharply divided in Michael
v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995) (upholding the state's grandparent visitation

statute). The statute before the court gave a grandparent a cause of action against the
custodian of a minor grandchild. Michael, 900 P.2d at 1146 (citing Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-7-101 (Michie 1994)). A majority of the court found that there was a compelling
state interest in protecting the best interests of a child that justified the grandparent
visitation statute. Id. at 1149. The court then sought to balance the "compelling interest
of the state in protecting the best interest of the child" against the natural parent's
fundamental liberty right. Id. at 1149. Finding the statute constitutional, the court concluded, "In addition to the compelling state interest attaching to the best interests of
the children, the compelling state interest in maintaining the right of association of
grandparents and grandchildren." Id. at 1151.
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visitation cases in several states. The first such case, which is arguably
the most significant one, is the decision of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee in Hawk v. Hawk,3 3 in which the court found the state's
grandparent visitation case to be unconstitutional. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court of Georgia in Brooks v. Parkerson,3 4 the Supreme
Court of Florida in Beagle v. Beagle,35 and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Herbst v. Sayre36 invalidated statutory provisions relating to
grandparent visitation.
In Hawk, after a number of family disputes over a long period of
time, the parents of two minor children denied visitation to the children's grandparents. The grandparents asked a court to grant visitation
pursuant to a statute that authorized reasonable court-ordered visitation
when it was in a child's best interest. 37 Without finding parental unfitness, the court ordered liberal visitation, having found that conflicts
within the family did not have to interfere with the relationship between
38
the children and their grandparents.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the trial court's decision
and found that under the Tennessee Constitution the statute violated the
right to privacy "as applied to [a] married couple, whose fitness as
40
parents is unchallenged."- 39 Subsequently, in Simmons v. Simmons
grandparents sought visitation over the objection of a child's natural
mother and a father who had adopted the child. The Tennessee Supreme
Court rejected the grandparents' argument that the decision in Hawk
was "limited to married, natural parents who have maintained continuous custody of their children and whose fitness as parents has not been
challenged.", 41 Approving denial of visitation to the grandparents, the
court held that absent substantial harm or danger to the child, the decisions of both adoptive parents and natural parents were constitutionally protected from intrusion by the state.4 2
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).
678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
971 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1998).
855 S.W.2d at 576.
Id. at 577.

39. Id. (citing

TENN. CONST.

art I, § 8).

40. 900 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1995).
41. Id. at 684.
42. Id. at 684-85. See also Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995) (holding
that the Georgia statute affording visitation rights to grandparents upon proof of circumstances making such rights necessary to a child's best interests was unconstitutional). Id. at 770-71. The court found the statute to be unconstitutional under both the
federal and state constitutions "because it does not clearly promote the health and
welfare of the child and does not require a showing of harm before state interference
is authorized." Id. at 774. The amended Georgia visitation statute gives visitation rights
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In Beagle v. Beagle4 3 the Supreme Court of Florida invalidated on
constitutional grounds provisions of a Florida statute that permitted
grandparent visitation over parental objections in intact families. 44 The
statutory amendment under review in Beagle required a trial court to
award reasonable grandparent visitation rights, even when a natural
parent had prohibited visitation, if the visitation would be in a child's
45
best interest.
The court in Beagle took note of and summarized "the divergent
views in other jurisdictions as to whether the government can constitutionally infringe upon the rights of parents to raise their children. "46
After a review of the legislative history of the Florida statute,4 7 the
court, which described the issue as "very narrow," addressed the following question: "Does the state have a compelling interest in imposing
grandparent visitation rights, in an intact family, over the objection of
at least one parent? ' 48 Stating that "[o]ur cases have made it abundantly clear that the State can satisfy the compelling state interest
standard when it acts to prevent demonstrable harm to a child," the
court held that the statute did not show the requisite compelling state
49
interest.
Simply stated, several courts in a number of jurisdictions have rendered conflicting decisions under state law as well as state or federal
constitutional grounds in a variety of circumstances and factual settings
relating to the rights of grandparents to visitation. And then along came
50
Troxel v. Granville.
Undoubtedly, most family law practitioners and teachers were surprised when for the very first time the U.S. Supreme Court decided to
review a state court judgment relating to grandparent visitation. In
Troxel a plurality of the Court affirmed a decision by the Washington
Supreme Court, which had held that Washington's grandparent visitation statute 51 was unconstitutional. A quite narrow decision by a pluto grandparents when "a court finds the health or welfare of a child would be harmed
unless such visitation is granted, and if the best interests of the child would be served
by such visitation." GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-7-3(c) (Supp. 1997).

43. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
44. Id. at 1272.
45. Id. at 1273 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(1) (West 1997)).
46. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1274-76 (citing Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 773; Herndon v.
Tuhey, 875 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Mo. 1993); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn.
1993); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Wyo. 1995)).
47. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1275.
48. Id. at 1276.
49. Id.
50. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
51. See WASH. REv. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
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rality of the Court held that the state statute, as applied, was an unconstitutional infringement of "the fundamental right of parents to make
52
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."
In Troxel unmarried parents had two children out of wedlock.5 3 After
the parents separated, the children's father visited them regularly at the
home of the paternal grandparents. 54 The father killed himself, and the
children's mother subsequently limited the paternal grandparents' visitation to one brief visit each month.55 The parents sued for more liberal
visitation 56 pursuant to the state statute, which provided, "Any person
may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including but not
limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights
for any person when visitation may serve the best interests of 57
the child
whether or not there has been any change of circumstances."Describing the Washington statute as "breathtakingly broad," Justice
O'Connor pointed out that the statutory language "effectively permits
any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent
concerning visitation of the parent's children to state court review. ,58
Additionally, Justice O'Connor noted that the statute "places the best
interest determination solely in the hands of the judge." 59 That judge's
view would prevail with no requirement that a court extend any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever to the parent's decision
that visitation would not be in a child's best interest. 60 According to
Justice O'Connor, "In practical effect, in the State of Washington a
court can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent
concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision
files a visitation petition, 6based solely on the judge's determination of
the child's best interest." '
Justice O'Connor then turned to the facts in the trial record, noting
that no special factors justified the state's interference with the parent's
"fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her
two daughters." 62 There had been no finding of the mother's unfitness,
an important factor in light of the "presumption that fit parents act in
52. 57 U.S. at 66-67.
53. Id.at 60.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 60-61.
56. Id. at 61.
57. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
58. 57 U.S. at 67.

59. Id. at 67.

60. Id.
61. ld.
62. Id. at 68.
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the best interests of their children." 6 3 The state trial court had given no
special weight to the mother's determination respecting the best interest
of her children; in fact, it placed on a fit parent "the burden of disproving that visitation was in the best interest of her daughters." 64 Thus,
"[t]he decisional framework employed by the [Washington] Superior
Court directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent
will act in the best interest of his or her child.", 65 Justice O'Connor
concluded,
As we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not permit a State
to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state trial judge believes a "better" decision
could be made. Neither the Washington nonparental visitation statute generally-which places no limits on either the persons who may petition
for visitation or the circumstances in which such a petition may be
granted-nor the Superior Court in this specific case required anything
more. Accordingly, we hold that [the statute] as applied in this case is
unconstitutional. 66
Importantly, the Court explicitly rested its decision "on the sweeping
breadth of [the Washington statute] and the broad unlimited power in
this case" but did not address the primary constitutional question
passed on by the Washington Supreme Court: "whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a
showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent
to granting visitation." 67 Rather, offering the rationale that state courts
adjudicate visitation standards case by case, the Court was hesitant to
hold that specific non-parental
visitation statutes violate the due process
68
clause as a per se matter.
Because of time and space constraints, I shall save for another day
comments concerning the separate concurring opinions of Justices
Souter and Thomas and the dissents of Justices Stevens, Scalia, and
Kennedy. The omission of this discussion is not meant to suggest,
however, that these additional opinions are not persuasive or that they
will not influence future decisions of the Court or state courts. 69 At
63. Id.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at

69.
69.
72-73.
73.

68. Id.

69. Anyone who has tried to assess the impact of Troxel will soon realize that it is
frequently cited for propositions that have scant relevance to the issues addressed in
that case. See, e.g., Central Texas Nudists v. County of Travis, 2000 WL 1784344
(Tex. App. 2000) (holding that county park rules that banned children from a clothingoptional park did not violate parent's due process rights to direct the upbringing of
their children); Cooper v. United States Ski Club, 2000 WL 1159066 (Colo. App. 2000)
(holding that release signed by parent of child who was subsequently injured seriously
was valid and enforceable against the child).
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this point, then, I shall discuss the impact of Troxel thus far and attempt to divine the future impact of Troxel on third party visitationthe custody and visitation rights of adult outsiders.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel state courts have rendered several decisions that cite the case in a variety of contexts, and
they continue to do so week after week. In light of the six separate
opinions in Troxel, including three dissenting opinions, it is hardly surprising that subsequent state court decisions treating grandparent visitation have made law on the subject even more disordered than it had
been before the case was decided. Simply stated, the Court's opinion
has not evoked a uniform response to the question of whether a given
requirements.
state's grandparent visitation statute meets constitutional
70 Illinois, 7' Iowa, 72
Florida,
of
courts
highest
the
writing,
this
As of
Kansas, 73 Maine, 74 Mississippi, 75 and Oklahoma 76 issued opinions that
take Troxel into account. In Belair v. Drew77 the Supreme Court of
Florida noted that Troxel was consistent with earlier decisions in which
it had found various provisions of the Florida grandparent visitation
statute to be unconstitutional. 78 Accordingly, the court quashed a trial
court's decision that had temporarily given a grandmother visitation
rights because "[o]n its face, such ruling directly contravenes the [diright to privacy and decision-making in
vorced custodial mother's]
79
child."
her
rearing
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Lulay v. Lulay80 cited and quoted
Troxel while denying visitation rights to a maternal grandmother of
three minor children whose divorced parents had joint custody. The
court held that the applicable statute as applied in the case was unconstitutional but declined to address the father's argument that the statute
70.
71.
72.
73.
2001).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
2000)

See
See
See
See

Belair v. Drew, 770 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2000).
2000).
Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521 (I11.
Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001).
Kansas Dep't Soc. & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Paillet, 16 P.2d 962 (Kan.

See Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000).
See Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 2001).
See Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla. 2000).
770 So. 2d 1164.
Id. at 1166. Court cited its decisions in Saul v. Brunetti, 753 So. 2d 26 (Fla.
(declaring to be unconstitutional a statutory provision permitting grandparent

visitation with a child born out of wedlock); Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla.
1998) (finding unconstitutional a provision that concerned grandparent visitation when
one or both of the child's parents are deceased); and Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271
(Fla. 1996) (holding unconstitutional statutory provision relating to grandparent visitation with child living with both parents).
79. 770 So. 2d at 1167.
2000).
80. 739 N.E.2d 521 (Ill.
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was facially unconstitutional. 8 1 The facts in Kansas Dep't of Soc. &
Rehabilitative Services v. Paillet82 were remarkably similar to those in
Troxel in that a child's father had died suddenly (in this case in an
automobile accident). A statute in Kansas permitted a court to grant to
the grandparents of an unmarried minor child reasonable visitation
rights "upon a finding that the visitation right would be in the child's
best interest and when a substantial relationship between the child and
the grandparent has been established." ' 83 As did the high court in Illinois, the Supreme Court of Kansas found the statute unconstitutional
as applied, noting that the intermediate appellate court's decision "essentially circumvents the presumption that a fit parent makes decisions
in the best interests of his or her child." ' Further, the court observed
that the decision "would not allow a fit parent to limit a grandparent's
visitation without losing the presumption that the parent is making the
decision in the best interest of the child.", 85 As in Troxel, the court
explicitly declined to find that the statute was facially violative of due
process.
In Santi v. Santi,86 however, while ruling that Iowa's grandparent
visitation statute was unconstitutional, the approach of the Supreme
Court of Iowa departed somewhat from the analysis adopted in other
states that had reached a similar result. The grandparent visitation statute before the Iowa court allowed a trial court to order visitation "regardless of whether circumstances such as divorce, the death of a parent, or an adoption have otherwise prompted court intervention in the
family's affairs." 87 The parents in Santi had been living together with
their three-and-a-half-year-old child in an intact family. After a series
of disputes with the child's grandparents and unsuccessful counseling,
the parents ended visitation between the grandparents and the child.
The court pointed out that while the grandparents alleged violation
of their substantive due process rights, they did not indicate whether
their challenge was based on Iowa's constitution or the U.S. Constitution. Because the trial court had found that the statute violated Iowa's
constitution, the Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged that the state and
federal due process clauses were virtually identical but focused its review on the Iowa Constitution.
81. 739 N.E.2d at 534.
82. 16 P.2d 962 (Kan. 2001).
83. KAN. STAT. ANN.
84. 16 P.3d at 970.

§

38-129.

85. Id. at 970-71.
86. 633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001).
87. Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 598.35(7)(1999)).
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Pointing out that "the Troxel plurality did not specify the appropriate
level of scrutiny for statutes that infringe on the parent child relationship," 88 after an extensive review of state and federal cases the Iowa
court determined that the Iowa statute required review under a strict
scrutiny standard. The court then discussed state court opinions in other
jurisdictions that had addressed grandparent visitation statutes, both
prior to and subsequent to Troxel, and pointed out that "[a] greater
number of courts, applying strict scrutiny, have ruled that their grandparent visitation statutes are unconstitutional to the extent they permit
a court to order grandparent visitation over the objections of married,
fit parents without a showing of actual or potential harm to the children." 89 The court then stated,
Turning to the Iowa statute before us, we note that while it does not suffer
from the patently unconstitutional scope of the Washington statute, it
nevertheless fails to accord fit parents the presumption deemed so fundamental in Troxel. [The statute] places the best interest decision squarely
in the hands of a judge without first according primacy to the parents'
own estimation of their child's best interests. Without a threshold finding
of unfitness the statute effectively substitutes sentimentality for constitutionality. It exalts the socially desirable goal of grandparent-grandchild
bonding over the constitutionally recognized
right of parent to decide with
90
whom their children will associate.
The court concluded that the Iowa grandparent statute was "fundamentally flawed, not because it fails to require a showing of harm, but
because it does not require a threshold finding of parental unfitness
before proceeding to the best interest analysis." 91 Further, the court
stated that it was "convinced that fostering close relations between
grandparents and grandchildren is not a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify court ordered visitation over the joint objection of
married parents in an intact nuclear family."' 92 Accordingly, the court
did not limit its finding to the application of the statute in the case
before it, as had been done in Troxel and its progeny. Rather, it soundly
determined that the Iowa statute was unconstitutional on its face.
In Hoff v. Berg93 the Supreme Court of North Dakota joined the ranks
of state courts that had found grandparent visitation statutes to be unconstitutional. In Hoff the paternal grandparents of an out-of-wedlock
child whose parents married three years after the child's birth were
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 317.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.

Id.

595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1999).
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dissatisfied with the visitation that the child's mother had given them
and sued for a schedule what would allow them to enforce their visitation rights.94 The court affirmed a trial court's decision that the visitation statute under which the grandparents sued,95 which permitted
the court to award visitation rights to the grandparents of an unmarried
minor, was unconstitutional. In summary of its holding, the court stated,
We conclude [that the statute] is unconstitutional to the extent it requires
courts to grant grandparents visitation rights with an unmarried minor
unless visitation is found not to be in the child's best interests, and presumes visitation rights of grandparents are in a child's best interests,
because it violates parents' fundamental liberty interest in controlling the
persons with whom their children may associate, which is protected
by
96
the due process clauses of our state and federal constitutions.
In contrast to the cases just discussed, the highest courts of both
Maine 97 and Mississippi 98 interpreted grandparent visitation statutes
subsequent to the decision in Troxel and readily found them to be constitutional. In Rideout v. Rideau99 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
identified the issue before it as
whether Maine's Grandparent Visitation Act violates the constitutional
rights of competent parents who choose not to have their children visit
with their grandparents. We conclude that the Act, as applied to the facts
presented to us, is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,
and thus does not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth
°°
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.l
The Maine statute permitted a grandparent to petition for visitation
when "[t]here is a sufficient existing relationship between the grandparents and the child."' 0 1 After a careful review of Troxel, the court
noted that the grandparents in the case before it had acted as the children's parents for a significant period of time and therefore concluded
that the statute "serves as a compelling state interest in addressing the
children's relationship with the people who have cared for them as
parents." 102 However, the court did not find the statute to be facially
94. The child's father had been so adjudicated but had not formally been granted
rights to visitation with the child. Id. at 286.
95. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1993).
96. Id. at 291-92. See also Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1 (111. 2002) (holding
that provisions of Illinois grandparent visitation statute were "facially unconstitutional").
97. See Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000).
98. See Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 2001).
99. 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000).
100. Id. at 294.
101. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1803(1)(B) (1998).
102. 761 A.2d at 303.
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constitutional, finding that "[b]ecause the Act is narrowly tailored to
serve that compelling interest, it may be applied in this case without
violating the rights of the parents." 103
In Zeman v. Stanford'°4 the Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed
a constitutional challenge to Mississippi's visitation statute, pointing
out that it had addressed the identical issue some years earlier. 0 5 The
court compared the broad sweep of the Washington statute invalidated
in Troxel with its own interpretation of the Mississippi statute, having
found in the earlier case that it had "specifically require[d] the Chancellor to consider certain factors before awarding visitation in order to
ensure that parents are not deprived of their right to rear their children
and determine their children's care, custody, and management." 106 The
court concluded that the limits it had imposed in its interpretation of
the statute "clearly result in the 'narrower reading' that was lacking in
Troxel."' 10 7 Accordingly, the
father's constitutionally grounded argu°8
ment was without merit.1
In a similar vein but with a contrary result, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in Neal v. Lee 10 9 re-examined its earlier holding in In re
Herbst" that the state's grandparent visitation statute violated Oklahoma's constitution. The court noted that the facts in Neal were similar
to those in Troxel, found that the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel
was applicable to the case before it, and held that Troxel did not change
its earlier interpretation of the state constitution in Herbst. 11
Not long after the Court's decision in Troxel, two distinguished academic commentators made the following observation: "Perhaps it is
a sign of the complex time in which we live that at the same time the
United States Supreme Court is reaffirming 'fundamental' parental
rights, more nonparents, whether they be domestic partners, grandparents, or others are 'parenting' children and seeking to continue relationships with them." 112 Stated differently, the writers are referring to
a line of state court decisions addressing the visitation claims of lesbian
co-parents that run roughly parallel in time to the aforementioned
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
789 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 2001).
Id. at 803 (citing Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1997)).
Id. (citing 693 So. 2d at 915).
Id.
Id. See also Stacy v. Ross, 798 So. 2d 1275 (Miss. 2001).
14 P.3d 547 (Okla. 2000).
971 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1998).
Neal, 14 P.3d at 549.

112. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Redefining Families,Reforming Custody Jurisdiction,and Refining Support Issues, 34

FAM. L.Q. 607 (2001).
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grandparent-visitation decisions. The paradigmatic case is the decision
in 1991 by the Court of Appeals of New York in Alison D. v. Virginia
M.11 3 Having established a relationship and lived together for approximately two years, Alison and Virgnia decided to have a child and
agreed that Virginia would be artificially inseminated."l 4 The couple
gave both of their surnames to the baby boy to whom Virginia gave
birth, and Alison shared in expenses incident to the child's birth, provided support, participated in child care, and shared in parental decisions in accordance with their agreement to share the rights and re1 15
sponsibilities of raising the child.
When the boy was two years and four months old, the couple separated, and Virginia subsequently stopped Alison's visitation. Alison
sued for visitation rights." 6 After a trial court and intermediate appellate courts dismissed the action, the appellate court affirmed in an opinion that emphasized Alison's concession that she was not the child's
biological or adoptive mother.' 1 7 Rather, she argued that she had acted
as a de facto parent 1 8 or that the court should recognize her as a parent
by estoppel' l 9 and give her standing to assert visitation rights. 120 Discussing the requirements of the applicable statute, the court observed,
Traditionally, in this state it is the child's mother and father who, assuming fitness, have the right to the care and custody of their child, even in
situations where the nonparent has exercised some control over the child
with the parents' consent. ... To allow the courts to award visitationa limited form of custody-to a third person
would necessarily impair
12 1
the parents' right to custody and control.
On the basis of this reading of the statute, the court rejected Alison's
claims of parental and visitation rights. Although Alison D. was the
113. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
114. Id. at 28.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 29.
117. Id.
118. See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216 (Ct. App. 1991) (describing de facto parent as one who, "on a day-to-day basis, assumes the role of parent,
seeking to fulfill both the child's physical needs and his psychological need for affection and care" (quoting In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 253 n.18 (Cal. 1974)).
119. See, Id. at 217 (explaining that some courts will employ equitable estoppel to
deny existence of parent-child relationship previously encouraged and supported by
legal parent).
120. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
121. Id. at 30 (citations omitted). The governing statute, New York's Domestic
Relations Law, provides that "either party may apply to the supreme court for a writ
of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before such court; and on the return
thereof, the court... may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of such
child to either parent ... as the case may require." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70(a)
(McKinney 2000).
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first decision by the highest court of a state concerning visitation by
co-parents, it was not the first such case nor the last. 2' Arguably, the
most significant cases were decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In In re Interest of Z.J.H. 123 Wendy L. Sporleder sought the right
to visit the adopted child of her former partner, 2 4 Janice Hermes, with
whom she had lived for eight years. 25 The parties had entered into a
co-parenting agreement providing that Hermes would adopt and that if
they later separated, they would decide on custody through mediation
1 26
and that the non-custodian would have liberal visitation rights.
After the parties separated, Hermes prevented Sporleder from seeing
the child, and Sporleder initiated an action to enforce the co-parenting
agreement. 27 A family court granted visitation rights to Sporleder, but
a circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that Sporleder did not have
the legal rights of a parent, that she lacked standing to exercise rights
1 28
as a parent, and that the agreement was void as against public policy.
The intermediate appellate court also held that Hermes was not equitably estopped from denying parental status to Sporleder. 129 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed 130 in a comprehensive and wellreasoned opinion.
The court first pointed out that a non-parent enjoyed no right to sue
for custody of a minor without showing unfitness of the natural or
adoptive parent or the existence of compelling circumstances that
would justify awarding custody to a third party. 131 Next, the court held
that Sporleder was not eligible for visitation under the governing statute, which allowed visitation petitions "by a grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has maintained a relationship similar

122. See, e.g.,Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
no statutory or decisional basis existed for awarding visitation over the objection of
the natural parent with whom the child lives to plaintiff who was not child's natural
mother, step-mother, nor adoptive mother of the child); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279
Cal. Rptr. 213 (Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting co-parent's claim for visitation on ground
that plaintiff could not establish visitation right under California law nor under such
alternative theories as such as de facto parenthood, the in loco parentis doctrine, or
equitable estoppel). But see A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (remanding case in which there was an oral co-parenting agreement for evidentiary hearing
on whether visitation would be in best interests of child).
123. 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
124. Id. at 206.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 213.
131. Id. at 204-09 (discussing standing in visitation and custody cases).
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to a parent-child relationship with the child" 132 if a court found such
visitation to be in the best interest of a child. 133 Based on its earlier
decisions, the court concluded that the statute applied only when there
was an underlying legal action affecting the family unit. 134 As for the
parties' co-parenting agreement, to the extent that the agreement purported to give custody or visitation rights to Sporleder, it was "inconsistent with legislative intent behind the custody and visitation statutes,
which prefer parents over third parties. It is also inconsistent with our
conclusion that, unless circumstances compel a contrary conclusion,135
it
is in [the child's] best interest to live in his legal parent's home."
Finally, the court rejected the assertion that Hermes was equitably estopped from denying that Sporleder was the child's parent because
"[t]he legal effects and 36
consequences of statutory limitations cannot be
1
estoppel."
by
avoided
Simply stated, the Wisconsin Supreme Court absolutely rejected the
proposition that a lesbian co-parent could be recognized as a parent
under the law whether because of statutory provisions, de facto parenthood, or equitable estoppel. Any satisfaction that could be taken
from this strong assertion of family autonomy and parental authority
was short-lived. Within two years, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. 137 had managed a complete flip-flop on the
issue, leaving in the dust its decision in Z.J.H.
The facts in H.S.H.-K. were remarkably similar to those in other
lesbian co-parent visitation cases. Sandra Holtzman sought either custody or visitation rights with the biological child of Elsbeth Knott, her
former partner.1 38 As it had in its earlier decision, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin held that the governing visitation statute in Wisconsin
was not applicable because the legislature intended it to apply only to
cases involving marriage dissolution.' 39 The court then concluded that
it was not the intent of the legislature that the visitation statute "be the
exclusive provision on visitation" nor that it "supplant or preempt the
courts' long recognized equitable power to protect the best interest of
132. WIs. STAT. ANN.§ 767.245(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
133. See In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 210-11 (Wis. 1991) (explaining
legislative intent and applicable case law) (overruled by In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,
533 N.W.2d 419, 434 (Wis. 1995)).
134. Id. at 209.
135. Id. at 211.
136. Id. at 212.
137. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
138. Id. at 420.
139. See id. at 424 (explaining that the custody provisions of the Wisconsin statute
did not apply to situations involving nonmarital relationships) (citing Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.245 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997)).
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a child by ordering visitation in circumstances not included in the
statute." 140
Assuring that it was "[m]indful of preserving a biological or adoptive
parent's constitutionally protected interests and the best interest of a
child," the court ruled that for a court to determine that visitation was
in a child's best interest, a petitioner would have to prove her parentlike relationship with the child and that "a significant triggering event
justifies state intervention in the child's relationship with a biological
or adoptive parent." 141 To show the existence of this critical parentlike relationship, the party claiming it had to satisfy four requirements,
the court said. First, the petitioner had to prove consent and fostering
of the relationship by the biological or adoptive parent.1 42 Second, the
child and the party asserting the claim must have lived in the same
household.143 Third, the party must have assumed the obligations of a
parent by taking, without expecting compensation, significant responsibility for the care, education, and development of the child, including
contributions toward child support. 144 Finally, the petitioner must have
maintained her parental role long enough to create "a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature." 145 The court would not consider
146
awarding visitation unless all four of the conditions were met.
Turning to the "significant triggering event" that would justify a
court's intervention in the relationship between a child and a natural or
adoptive parent, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that the claimant for visitation had to prove substantial interference by the parent
with the claimant's parent-child relationship and prove that the claimant
had sought an order of visitation within a reasonable time after that
interference. 147 In summary, if a petitioner for visitation could prove
the elements of a parent-child relationship together with a substantial
triggering event and a petition for court-ordered visitation within a
reasonable time after that event, the trial court would then determine
148
whether visitation was in the child's best interests.
One might well argue that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision,
which effectively found equitable principles in the air and was concededly unsupported by any statutory authority whatsoever, was beyond
140. Id. at 424-25.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 435.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
Id.

184

Family Law Quarterly, Volume 36, Number 1, Spring 2002

the court's authority or competence. Nevertheless, courts in other jurisdictions rushed to adopt its reasoning in lesbian co-parent visitation
disputes. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in E.N.O. v.
L.M.M. 149 reached the same result since the facts were similar to those
in H.S.H.-K and other visitation cases involving lesbian co-parents. The
Massachusetts court conceded to the natural mother's argument that it
lacked statutory authority to order visitation to someone who stood in
a parent-like position. Nevertheless, the court held that a trial judge
could award visitation pursuant to its equity jurisdiction and that the
former partner of the natural mother was a de facto parent of the child
in a nontraditional family. The only dissenter in the case made the point
cogently and persuasively:
The probate court's order in this case was wholly without warrant in
statute, precedent, or any known legal principle, and yet the majority of
this court has upheld it. As such, the opinion the court delivers today is
a remarkable example of judicial lawmaking. It greatly expands the
courts' equity jurisdiction with respect to the welfare of children and
adopts the hitherto unrecognized principle of de facto parenthood as a
sole basis for ordering visitation. Even while expanding judicial authority
and making an addition to the common law, the court speaks as though
the decision were nothing extraordinary. In light of the denigration of
parental rights and the judicial infringement on the province of the Legislature effected by the court's decision, all without an acknowledgment
50
of the novelty of that decision, I must respectfully dissent.'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also seized upon the novel rationale enunciated in Wisconsin. In VC. v. M.L.B. 151 The court adopted
the de facto parent definition and recognized the right of a lesbian
former partner to seek visitation as a psychological parent. The court
stated,
Third parties who live in familial circumstances with a child and his or
her legal parent may achieve, with the consent of the legal parent, a
psychological parent status vis-i-vis a child. Fundamental to a finding of
the existence of that status is that a parent-child bond has been created.
That bond cannot be unilaterally terminated by the legal parent. When
there is a conflict over custody and visitation between the legal parent
and a psychological parent, the legal paradigm is that of two legal
parents
152
and the standard to be applied is the best interest of the child.
As in Wisconsin, the natural parent had to consent to the relationship
between a third party and the child and, indeed, must have fostered the
149. 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999).
150. Id. at 894-895.
151. 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).

152. Id. at 555.
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relationship.' 53 These cases and their ilk are likely to be relied on in
the future by courts seeking to exercise discretion in matters involving
children, free of the restraint of legislative requirements. It is ironic that
while the court in Troxel placed constitutional limitations, however illdefined, on grandparent visitation, without even a nod in the direction
of Troxel state courts are likely to continue to chip away at family
autonomy and parental authority for the benefit of adult outsiders.
The cases that afford visitation to self-defined lesbian co-parents over
the objections of natural parents do not reach irrational results. After
all, the lesbian co-parents who sought visitation in these cases were not
only present at the creation, in a manner of speaking, but also participated in child-rearing and the other sorts of traditional family functions
that society values. As appealing as the results may be, such decisions-or to put it more pointedly, the process by which the courts
reach them-can open the door to virtually unfathomable exercises of
judicial discretion, all in derogation of the constitutionally protected
interests of natural parents with respect to their children.
Anyone who has the least doubt about the confusion and uncertainty
about grandparent visitation wrought by the plurality opinion in Troxel
or the spate of cases likely to adopt the questionable analysis of the
54
majority's co-parent visitation decision In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. 1
need only consult several trial court opinions in New York that purport
to have resolved these issues. Three months after the Supreme Court
155
decided Troxel, a family court in New York in Smolen v. Smolen
declined to hold that a New York statute that governed grandparent
visitation1 56 violated, as applied, a mother's due process rights. A little
more than three months later, the New York Supreme Court in Hertz
v. Hertz1 57 held that the statute was "unconstitutional, in that it violates the [parents) due process rights, specifically their fundamental
right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children." 158
Exactly one week after the decision in Hertz, another New York
family court in Fitzpatrickv. Youngs 159 ruled that New York's statutory
153. See also Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
154. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
155. 713 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Fam. Ct. 2000).
156. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (providing that "[w]here either or both of the
parents of a minor child are deceased or where circumstances show that conditions
exist which equity would see fit to intervene," the court may "make such directions
as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights for such grandparent
or grandparents in respect to such child").
157. 717 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Sup. Ct. 2000), rev'd 738 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. Div. 2000).
158. Id. at 500 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).
159. 717 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Fam. Ct. 2000).
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grandparent visitation scheme did not violate parents' due process
rights. In Davis v. Davis160 a New York family court skirted the question
of the statute's constitutionality and purported to interpret it so as to
avoid running afoul of Troxel. Subsequently, the New York Supreme
Court in Levy v. Levy,' 6 1 relying expressly on Troxel, declared that the
New York statute was, as applied, unconstitutional. Finally, an intermediate appellate court in New York reversed and remanded the lower
court's determination in Hertz that the statute was facially unconstitutional but declined to express an opinion with respect to the constitutionality of the statute as applied in the case before it.162 In sum, the
New York cases, like those in other jurisdictions, rather than reinforcing
the long-standing respect for family autonomy and parental authority,
reflect the confusion and uncertainty that are the progeny of Troxel.
With respect to the novel lesbian co-parent visitation doctrine that
appears to be sweeping the country, the picture in New York is less
clear, although there has been at least one warning sign. In Alison D.
v. Virginia M. 163 New York's highest court rejected the visitation petition of a lesbian co-parent, who claimed standing as a de facto parent
or as a parent by estoppel. Some two decades later, a New York family
court in Matter of J.C. v. C.T 164 has opened the door to recognition of
such claims, despite the clear and unequivocal teaching of Alison D.
After citing with approval the dissenting opinion in Alison D., the court
embraced the opinions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Custody of
66
H.S.H.-K.165 and the Supreme Court of New Jersey in VC. v. M.J.B. 1
The family court summarized the elements of the test under which a
biological stranger to a child could be granted standing to seek visitation as follows: If a non-biological or non-adoptive person who is not
otherwise granted statutory standing sought visitation with a child or
children with whom he or she alleged a parental relationship, they had
to demonstrate
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to and fostered
the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child;
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

725 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Faro. Ct. 2001).
28 N.Y.J.L. col. 2 (Mar. 22, 2001).
See Hertz v. Hertz, 738 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
711 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Fain. Ct. 2000).
533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
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(3) that the petitioner assumed the obligations of parenthood by undertaking significant responsibility for the child's care, education and
development, including contributions to the child's support, financial
or otherwise without the expectation of financial compensation; and
(4) that the petitioner had been in a parental role for a length of time
sufficient to establish with the child a bonded, dependent relationship
67
which was parental in nature.'
This New York court's words are strikingly familiar because the
court entirely relied on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Custody of H.S.H.-K. 168 The court cited Alison D. only in an attempt to
distinguish it and heavily relied on the dissenting opinion in that case.
What might one conclude from all of this? Family autonomy and its
concomitant parental authority are under an unrelenting attack from the
new child savers. The spate of lesbian co-parent visitation cases that
emerged in the 1990s, decided without statutory authority or constitutional concerns, have clearly intensified this attack. Troxel, as it has
been read by state courts purporting to apply it to grandparent visitation
statutes, further endangers family privacy by adding to the confusion
about visitation rights of adult outsiders that existed prior to the Supreme Court's decision.

167. In re J.C., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Faro. Ct. 2000).
168. 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995).

